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Matthews: Proposed Threat Hearsay Exception

ARTICLE

MAKING THE CRUCIAL
CONNECTION: A PROPOSED
THREAT HEARSAY EXCEPTION
DONNA MEREDITH MATTHEWS·

To the man or woman on the street, the relevance
and probative value of such evidence is both
obvious and compelling, especially those statements made just days before the homicide. It
seems only just and right that a crime victim's
own words be heard, especially in the court
where the facts and circumstances of her demise
are to be presented. However, the laws and appellate court decisions that must be applied by
the trial court hold otherwise. 1

* J.D. expected 1997, University of Oregon. I want to thank Laird
Kirkpatrick for his many valuable comments on the progressive drafts of this
article, for the initial inspiration that led to my writing it, and for his support
and appreciation of my work. I am also indebted to Carolina Forell and Lisa
Kloppenberg for their comments and insights.
1. Judge Lance A. Ito in The People of the State of California v. Orenthal
James Simpson, explaining an evidentiary ruling denying admission of Nicole
Brown Simpson's statements. Ito went on to say, "In factual situations distressingly similar to the assumed facts of this case, the California Supreme Court has
given clear guidance to the trial court. The courts in People v. Arcega (1982) 32
C.3d 503, and People v. Ireland (1969) 70 C.2d 522, have clearly held that it is
reversible error to admit the hearsay statements by a homicide victim expressing
fear of the defendant, even when made on the very day of the homicide. (See also
People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 C.3d 589, 607-610) The Evidence Code Section 1250 exception argued by prosecution on the theory of 'learned helplessness' is not supported by the offer of proof and the defense has not raised any issue concerning
Brown Simpson's acts of conduct preceding the homicide. State v. Simpson, 1995
WL 21768, at *3 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995).
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This striking statement from Judge Ito in State v. Simpson
highlights a persistent flaw in the rules of evidence. That is, a
victim's statements to friends, family, counselor, or battered
women's shelter are frequently inadmissible in court, unless
they fit into one of the existing hearsay exceptions. In the
Simpson case ruling, the victim's "words" that were not "heard"
included statements by Nicole Brown Simpson that she was
deathly afraid of O.J. Simpson, that he had threatened her,
and that he had said if he couldn't have her, no one could. 2
Nicole's "testimony" against her ex-husband was excluded,
barred by the hearsay rules. When a trial judge feels impelled
to explain and apologize for evidence rulings, it signals that
something is seriously awry. Furthermore, it signals that the
rules should be changed to reconcile evidentiary decisions with
what seems "only just and right."
A victim of domestic violence who is ultimately murdered
cannot speak for herself' because she is dead, killed in part
because the law is seemingly helpless to intervene on her behalf. Almost invariably, a victim of domestic homicide 4 endures years of hidden violence and terror, within the private
sphere of the home, before she is killed. 5 Typically, when she
finally realizes that she must leave and finds the strength to
do so, the abuser cannot tolerate her escape from control, so he
kills her. 6 Because his threats and assaults have predominant2. Id. at 25.
3. I use "she" for the victim and "he" for the perpetrator because the great
majority of domestic violence is perpetrated by a man against a woman. This is
not meant to devalue the significance of violence within same sex domestic relationships nor of the rare cases in which a woman abuses her male domestic partner. Both of these situations should be deemed included within the gendered
terms "she" and "he."
4. I use the term "domestic homicide" because, much of the time, these murders occur after the woman has left the marital or pseudo-marital relationship,
and because these homicides belong on the continuum of what is commonly termed
"domestic violence." Some courts have carved out specific exceptions to admit statements by the victim regarding threats, fear, and sometimes abuse in what they
call "marital homicide" cases, which some of these courts have explicitly held to
apply to live-in relationships. See e.g., State v. Young, 852 P.2d 510 (Kan. 1993).
However, the term "domestic homicide" seems more accurate and intrinsically
inclusive of live-in relationships, so I use it here.
5. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
The Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd, eds., 1988); LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE (1979).
6. Martha R. Mahoney, Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency in THE PuBLIC
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ly occurred in secret, she has no witnesses: Her only witness is
herself, and she is dead.
Often, the words the domestic homicide victim has spoken
to others cannot be heard in the trial of her accused murderer.
Courts admit certain statements by victims when they fit into
existing categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule. However,
when they do admit threat hearsay, many courts appear to
contort the rules in order to do so, and which statements they
find admissible varies significantly from state to state. 7 Further, most threat hearsay comes in under the state-of-mind
exception to the hearsay rule, which does not admit the statements as substantive evidence and subjects them to limiting
instructions. s Many courts apply the hearsay rules more categorically and simply bar the victim's declarations as inadmissible hearsay or character evidence. 9
In any event, the murdered woman can no longer speak
for herself, and without her statement a killer may go free or
be convicted of a lesser offense. Yet, if she had been almostfatally attacked, but had not seen her attacker, the threats
would be admissible if offered by the victim against him at
tria1. 10 The effect of this evidentiary loophole is reminiscent of
the cynical adage that if you hit someone with your car, back
up to make sure they're dead (to avoid the extensive pain and
suffering damages). At a minimum, absent admission of the
victim's statements as substantive evidence, the common patNATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk,
Eds. 1994). These killings are generally extremely brutal-often by bludgeoning,
multiple stab wounds, or repeated close-range gunshots. A five-year study in NEw
York City revealed a similar pattern of brutality in domestic homicides. Pam
Belluck, A Woman's Killer is Very Often Her Partner, A Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Nat1 Ed.), Mar. 31, 1997, at A12. The leader of the study noted that women
"are very likely to be punched and hit and burned and thrown out of windows" in
killings that "spoke of enormous rage." [d. See also, Part II, infra, and cases
cited therein.
7. See discussion of cases, Part II, infra.
S. Under FED. R. EVID. S03(3), and its state counterparts, statements of the
declarant concerning his or her present mental attitudes and intentions or physical
condition are admissible; however the rule expressly excludes "a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed." FED. R. EVlD. S03(3).
9. See, e.g., cases discussed in Part II, infra. See generally CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 4.11, 4.20-22, S.39 (1994).
10. Statements by the party constitute admissions by a party-opponent and are
not hearsay when offered against him. FED. R. EVID. S01(d)(2).
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tern of domestic violence escalating from abuse to death
threats and then homicide will never be properly accounted for
in the legal paradigm.11 To correct this situation, I argue that
the rules of evidence be amended to create an exception for the
"victim's own words" to be heard.
This article discusses how courts admit and exclude threat
hearsay in the domestic homicide context and suggests an
approach for admission of such evidence. After analyzing the
current evidentiary status of the victim's statements regarding
threats in homicide cases in which an apparently abusive
spouse/partner is accused, I argue for adoption of a new hearsay exception that permits systematic admission of victims'
statements concerning threats and violence by the accused.
The victim can no longer speak. for herself because she has
been killed, often because the law is apparently helpless to
intervene on her behalf, even when asked. Consequently, the
legal system must change to admit her words, even if it is too
late to save her. While such statements would not, and should
not, suffice to convict someone of homicide, they may well
provide the critical piece of cumulative evidence that convinces
a jury that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part I provides an overview of domestic violence and why
the victim's statements should be accorded special status in
domestic homicide cases. This part describes the pattern of
domestic violence that escalates into serious threats and finally
death, particularly when the victim tries' to escape. As a recent, well-known example, I examine the treatment of threat
hearsay in State v. Simpson. 12 Finally, this part discusses related hearsay challenges and what commentators have proposed to allow their admission despite the hearsay rule.
Part II surveys the ways courts admit or exclude threat
hearsay under the current rules of evidence and then examines

11. In reviewing available cases that involve rulings on threat hearsay, the
overwhelming impression is how uncannily similar are the fact patterns. Although
individual circumstances vary, these cases uniformly involve a pattern of prior
domestic violence, an attempt to leave the abusive relationship or otherwise escape
the partner's control, overt or covert threats by the partner, and then a brutal
homicide. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Part II, and accompanying notes.
12. 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995).
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the limitations inherent in the inconsistent and restrictive
application of the existing hearsay exceptions. Each exception
courts apply in this context is analyzed and then explicated by
discussion of domestic homicide cases in which that exception
is used to admit or exclude hearsay threat evidence. The particular focus is on those situations where threats were made in
secret and subsequently disclosed to apparently trustworthy
witnesses prior to institution of any legal proceedings against
the defendant. The central question is whether, and to what
extent, the existing rules achieve the purpose of the hearsay
rules and of justice in the domestic homicide context.
Part III recommends that the Federal Rules of Evidence be
amended to provide a hearsay exception for statements by
domestic homicide victims regarding threats and violence by
the accused. This part briefly reviews various broad critiques
and proposals for reform of the hearsay rules and analyzes
each in terms of how it might affect admission of threat evidence. I conclude that, while some of these proposals might
lead to admission of threat hearsay, it is unlikely that such
sweeping reforms will be adopted or that, if adopted, they
would provide the necessary recognition of the validity of the
victim's words. Instead, I propose a specific hearsay exception
for statements by homicide victims concerning fear of or
threats by the accused, limited to situations in which prior
incidents of abuse or threats can be demonstrated.
I. SILENCING THE VICTIM - WHAT'S WRONG WITH

EXCLUDING FUTURE THREAT EVIDENCE
Studies of domestic homicides find a clear pattern of abuse
escalating into death threats and finally murder-particularly
when the victim finally attempts to leave or in fact leaves her
abuser. 13 Martha Mahoney calls this "separation assault,"
pointing out that more than half of domestic homicides are
committed after the victim left the relationship, "when the
batterer's quest for control becomes lethal.,,14 Before she was
killed, the victim may have told others that her-usually estranged or former-partner threatened to kill her, or that she
13. See, e.g., ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD 87-96 (1994).
14. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 79.
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was afraid that he would kill her. Yet her statements to others
about what her abuser said or did are hearsay, and therefore
inadmissible unless they fit one of the categorical exceptions to
the hearsay rule.
Even though the victim, if alive, could give direct testimony
about those threats because they would qualify as admissions
of a party opponent,15 others cannot testify about what she
claims that he said or did. Thus, unless someone witnesses the
partner's threats or the victim's statements fit into an existing
hearsay exception, the victim is truly silenced by her abuser
because her words cannot be introduced in court. Exclusion of
this evidence creates a vital gap in the case against the abuser,
because, absent the threat evidence, juries often do not make
the crucial connection between domestic violence and domestic
homicide. 16
In contrast, a number of commentators argue that the
experience of the victim should be given special status. This
special status should be accorded because common myths
about domestic abuse seriously affect jury perceptions in
abuse-homicide cases. 17 Further, the victim is in fact the best
witness against the perpetrator but he has "procured" her
absence from testifying. IS More broadly, the victim should be
given particular credence because the continuing isolation of
and violence against women in the domestic sphere constitutes
a serious societal problem that must be addressed on various
fronts.19 Through its failure to take domestic violence seriously, including exclusion of a domestic homicide victim's crucial

15. A statements is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is the
party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
16. See Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for
Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141 (1995).
17. See note 47 infra, and accompanying text.
18. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 58 n.273; Mahoney supra note 6, at 74-79.
19. Barbara Hart, Beyond the "Duty to Warn": A Therapist's "Duty to Protect"
Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 234
(Kersti Yllo & Michele Bogard eds., 1988). See generally JONES, supra note 13;
THE PuBLIC NATURE OF PRNATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk, Eds. 1994); MURRAY A. STRAUS, RICHARD J. GELLES & SUZANNE K.
STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 221-252
(Anchor Books, 1981); WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5, at 185-250.
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testimony, the legal system implicitly condones the behavior of
men who batter and kill "their women" and fails to give these
women the protection of the law.
An abuse victim is silenced in part because a shroud of
secrecy and misunderstanding still surrounds domestic violence, and because the dualistic personality traits common to
many batterers create a false public image of the relationship.20 In general, batterers who ultimately kill display an
obsessive need to control all aspects of the marriage, including
what outsiders observe,21 and they will make "extraordinary
efforts" to prevent the domestic partner from leaving. 22 Many
batterers characteristically have dual or contradictory personality traits, which are often manifested in being charming and
personable to others, yet cruel and violent to their domestic
partners. 23 Dr. Lenore Walker, a nationally recognized expert
on domestic violence, estimates that only 20 percent of
batterers are violent outside the private, domestic context, so
the violence remains obscured or invisible to outside observers.24 Thus, the violence is largely sequestered from public
view and subsequently disregarded by the legal system.
The sharp distinction between the public and private demeanor
of the batterer makes a victim of domestic violence the best
judge of the abuser's violent potential. 25 Because the violence
is largely hidden from public view, the victim is the primary,
often only, witness to the violence. Further, the abuser's victim
is most able to assess his dangerousness, because she has a
heightened sensitivity to how and when the violence might
occur. 26 Although the abuse victim's perception is not infallible, "the instrumental nature of his violence makes her, the

20. See generally WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5; JONES, supra
note 13; KATHLEEN H. HOFELLER, Ph.D, BATTERED WOMEN, SHATTERED LIVES
49-79 (1983).
21. JONES, supra note 13, at 89-95. Jones convincingly likens the patterns of
abuse and control in an abusive relationship to methods of coercion used in brainwashing and breaking prisoners of war. [d. at 89-92.
22. Frager Griffith, supra note 16.
23. [d.
24. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5, at 36; HOFELLER, supra
note 20, at 85.
25. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 58.
26. Hart, supra note 19, at 240.
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target, the closest observer.,,27 That is, the victim has a greater necessity to measure her abuser's violent potential than any
outside observer could have. In essence, the victim holds
unique and compelling evidence, so the legal system should
give special credence to her perception. Thus, courts should
consider a victim's statements regarding death threats by and
fear of the accused as some of the most relevant and probative
evidence available in a prosecution for her murder.
A. A CASE IN POINT: THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. ORENTHAL
JAMES SIMPSON

A few days after the not-guilty verdict in State v.
Simpson,28 a woman juror asserted her belief that the prosecution had wasted a huge amount of time in the case by belaboring the domestic abuse evidence-that this was about murder, not domestic abuse. 29 She simply could not make the connection. Might her, and the other jurors', view have changed if
the prosecution had been allowed to present its evidence of
Nicole Brown Simpson's call to a women's shelter only four
days before her murder, in which she expressed her fear of
O.J.?30 Of Nicole's statements to friends and family that she
knew O.J. would kill her, and that he would get away with
it?31 Of Nicole's counseling sessions in which she disclosed her
fear of O.J. and that he had threatened to kill her?32 Of
Nicole's statement that O.J. had told her, "If I can't have you,
no one can,,?33
That threat and fear evidence was excluded, as was much

27. [d.
28. 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995).
29. NATIONAL PuBLIC RADIO, Morning Edition, October 17, 1995.
30. State v. Simpson, 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995) (Ruling
on In Limine Motion to Exclude Evidence of Domestic Discord). See also, Laurie L.
Levenson, Abuse By Any Other Name: The Admissibility of Domestic Violence Evidence in The Simpson Case, 1995 WL 5632 (O.J. Comm., Jan. 9, 1995); Susan B.
Jordan, The Rules of Evidence: Will The Jury Hear The Whole Domestic Violence
Story?, 1995 WL 6018 (O.J. Comm., Jan. 10, 1995); Susan B. Jordan, What's Going
On Here? The Hearings on Domestic Violence, 1995 WL 12153 (O.J. Comm., Jan.
16, 1995).
31. State v. Simpson, 1995 WL 21768, at *3.
32. [d.
33. [d.
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other evidence of recurring violent and abusive incidents in the
relationship. The court did admit some "prior acts" evidence
regarding Simpson's "prior assaults upon Nicole Brown
Simpson ... as to the issues of motive, intent, plan and identity,"34 as well as statements regarding Nicole's fear of Simpson
that fit into the excited utterance exception. 35 The court admitted other abuse evidence "to establish a pattern of conduct ... indicating an escalating course of conduct indicative of
the motive, planning, intent and identity of the assailant in
the homicide of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman."36 Nicole's statements to friends and family, to her
counselor, and to staff at a women's shelter appear to be consistent with demonstrating such "an escalating course of conduct." Nonetheless, the court held that they did not fit an existing hearsay exception so were inadmissible in the trial for
her murder.37
While admission of Nicole's statements might not have
affected the outcome of the Simpson case-with its rogue police
officer and tainted investigation, its rich and famous defendant
with a $10 million legal defense fund, and its highly charged
political and racial atmosphere-it is possible that the jurors
may have been able to make the connection between the pattern of domestic violence and domestic homicide. At a minimum, perhaps the Simpson juror quoted above would not have
so glibly disregarded the cumulative evidence of violence,
abuse, extreme jealousy, and stalking, and how that evidence
supported conviction of a "heroic" man like O.J. Simpson for
brutally slashing his ex-wife and her male friend when she
finally escaped his control. And perhaps the viewing public
would begin to make the connection as well and to take domestic violence more seriously.

34. [d. at *1-2.
35. For example, the recording of Nicole Brown Simpson's 911 call made while
O.J. Simpson was breaking in her door and screaming was admitted under the
excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions; the entire tape was
admitted, including Brown Simpson's expressions of fear. [d.
36. State v. Simpson, 1995 WL 21768, at *1-2.
37. [d.
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B. THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
Only recently has American society begun to treat private
violence against women as a matter of public concern. 38 The
effect of domestic violence on women, both psychologically and
physically, remains inadequately addressed in society and in
law. The escalating pattern of domestic abuse is not well understood by most people. Somehow, domestic violence is still
generally viewed as anomalous behavior that is best handled
in private, within the family, and which was likely provoked by
the victim herself. 39 Yet battering is the main cause of injury
to women, more than injuries from auto accidents, rapes, and
muggings combined. 40 Further, extensive studies have found
that one-third to one-half of all female homicide victims are
killed by a domestic partner, often after she decides to leave
the relationship.41
Research and anecdotal evidence indicates that domestic
abusers exist throughout all levels of society and that they
cannot be easily spotted by outsiders. That is, "[b]attering
occurs in all social groupings . . . cross[ing] all racial, ethnic,
socioeconomic, religious, age and geographic boundaries."42 In
38. See, e.g., Steffani J. Saitow, Battered Woman Syndrome: Does the "Reasonable Battered Woman n Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CN. CONFINEMENT 329
(1993); Frager Griffith, supra note 16.
39. Id.
40. Jane O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, September 5, 1983.
See also Belluck, supra no~ 6 ("More women in New York City are killed by their
husbands or boyfriends than in robberies, disputes, sexual assaults, drug violence,
random attacks or any other crime ... where the relationship between the murderer
and victim is known."). Further, the New York City study found that the number
of domestic homicides increased during the time period studied, while total crime
and murders of women decreased. Id.
41. F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1988) (one-third to one-halO; American
Medical Association, AM. J. OF PuB. HEALTH 70:65-66 (1989) (fifty percent);
Belluck, supra note 6 ("nearly half of the women [in the New York City study]"
compared with the national figure of 40 percent). In a detailed study of police and
FBI records and other supplemental materials, Jacquelin Campbell found that FBI
and police statistics under-report spousal homicides. Jacquelin C. Campbell, If I
Can't Have You, No One Can: Power and Control in Homicide of Female Partners
in FEMICIDE: THE POLITICS OF WOMAN KILLING 100-101 (Jill Radford & Diana
Russell, Eds., 1992).
42. NANCY HUTCHINGS, THE VIOLENT FAMILY: VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND ELDERS 73 (1988); But see Belluck, supra note 6 (study of women
killed in New York City between 1990 and 1994 found that two-thirds of domestic
homicides were in the poorest areas of the city and three-quarters of the victims
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fact, "[b]ecause domestic violence is so widespread, it is unlikely that there is one 'personality type' which is characteristic of
all violent men. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify
some common factors."43 These factors include insecurity and
extreme jealousy; an excessive need to control the partner and
to prevent her from leaving; and a dual or contradictory personality characterized by an ability to be charming to others
yet cruel to his partner.44
Although such evidence would be inadmissible "profile"
evidence if introduced in court to show that the accused acted
in accordance with that profile (or failed to do SO),45 discussion
of it here helps us to understand the pattern of violence. Further, such evidence may be useful in establishing a foundation
for admitting threat hearsay and could potentially be used in
educating jurors about domestic violence and homicide.
The legal system has done little to acknowledge the connection between battering and domestic homicide. This
marginalization of domestic violence both leads to a failure of
peopl~including jurors-to understand the effects and patterns of domestic violence and results in continuing isolation
and legal disregard of the victims. 46 Understanding the association between domestic violence and domestic homicide is not
about predicting that a particular individual will murder his
wife, or even that a particular abusive spouse did in fact kill
his wife. Rather, discerning the pattern of escalating, often
secret, violence may show motive, planning, intent, or identity
of the assailant, as some courts already recognize. 47 Acknowledging that this pattern of violence may well have culminated
were African American or Hispanic).
43. HOFELLER, supra note 20, at 83.
44. 1d. at 83-87. See also Frager Griffith, supra note 16.
45. Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, 52 AUT LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1989). See generally,
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9.
46. Various articles discuss the misconceptions and myths commonly held
about domestic violence and their effect on juries. See, e.g., Charles P. Ewing &
Moss Aubrey, Battered Women and Public Opinion: Some Realities About the Myth,
2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257 (1987); Mary Dodge & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert
Conceptions of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 271 (1991).
47. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 886 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App. 1994); Duvall v.
State, 825 P.2d 621 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991); United States v. Elmore, 33 M.J. 387
(Milit. App. 1991); State v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1991).
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in homicide may also provide a basis for admitting the victim's
statements about threats and intimidation by her partner. This
then may help to free the victims-both living and dead-from
silence and isolation within the violent relationship.
There are a few analogous contexts in which justice seems to
call for specific adaptations of the hearsay rules: where a witness has been made unavailable to testify by the accused, and
where the victim of child sexual abuse is the only witness. I
discuss these below, to illustrate some of the underlying moral
grounds for admission of threat hearsay and to consider proposals for hearsay exceptions that may be applicable in the
threat hearsay context as well.
C. ANALOGY TO PROCUREMENT OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY WAIVER BY MISCONDUCT

Many courts contend with a related hearsay problem, that
of how to admit testimony when the defendant has procured a
witness's unavailability.48 Courts admit hearsay against a
party, including a criminal defendant, who is found to have
wrongfully caused the unavailability of the hearsay declarant,
under the residual hearsay exception. 49 Courts apply the
hearsay rule more expansively when they determine that the
defendant has made the witness unavailable,50 generally hold48. See Paul T. Markland, The Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defendant Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of a Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 995 (1994), for an overview of these cases and the arguments in favor of
admitting the witness's testimony.
49. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied 460 U.S. 1053 (1983), rehearing denied 461 U.S. 940 (1983). See generally
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9 at § 8.66. Under the residual or "catchall"
hearsay exception, a statement not specifically covered by any of the categorical
exceptions to the hearsay rule
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is admissible] if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
50. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802 n.4 (3d ed.
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ing that by doing so the defendant has waived the right to
raise hearsay objections to admission of that witness's out-ofcourt statements or to assert violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 51 This common-law waiver
requires a preliminary finding-generally by a preponderance
of the evidence, although some courts have held it to a clear
and convincing standard-that the defendant did in fact procure the unavailability of the witness, after commencement of
the proceedings. 52 In part, underlying these rulings is the belief that disclosure of relevant information at a trial is of paramount interest. 53 Thus, any significant interference with that
interest, except by exercising a legal right to object, is a wrongful act.
In this context, courts traditionally limit admissible hearsay to prior grand jury testimony, although some courts have
extended the admission to other statements. Commentators
argue that complete waiver should operate to admit all such
statements. 54 In line with this approach, the Rules Advisory
Committee recently proposed a "waiver by misconduct" rule,
1991), citing Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied
460 U.S. 1053 (1983), rehearing denied 461 U.S. 940 (1983).
51. See Markland, supra note 48, at 997.
52. Compare United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), rehearing
denied 671 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1008 (1982) (applying
the clear and convincing standard), with United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d
269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand 561 F.Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 722
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) ("We see no reason to
impose upon the government more than the usual burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence where waiver by misconduct is concerned.").
53. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at § 802.
54. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)
(defendant's involvement in murder of witness precluded assertion of confrontation
rights); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1980) (waiver where witness
feared retribution and therefore did not testify after receiving threats from defendant); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant's
procurement of witness's absence from trial by threats constituted waiver of confrontation rights), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Paul Markland argues that
"the most equitable response to the problem of defendant-procured witness unavailability is the complete abrogation of the defendant's ability to object on confrontation or hearsay grounds to the admission of any of that witness' [sic] out-of-court
statements, including unsworn, ex parte, and extrajudicial declarations." Markland,
supra note 48 at 998. See also Kenneth Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 139
(1972) (arguing that a defendant who is found responsible for murdering a witness
should be prevented from using the confrontation clause to block that witness's
statements in court).
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Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). Under the proposed rule, "[a]
statement offered against a party who has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness" is not inadmissible as hearsay.55 The proposed rule potentially reaches quite
broadly: it is not limited to prior grand jury testimony, so in
theory any prior statements would be admissible under the
new rule if the conditions are met.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a prior grand jury
statement by a witness made unavailable by the wrongful
conduct of a party is admissible against that party if that
statement would have been admissible if the witness had testified. 56 This testimony of a witness unavailable at trial is usually admitted under the residual exception. 57 The rule derives
both from the public policy of protecting the integrity of the
adversary process and from the equitable doctrine of "clean
. hands."58 A controlling principle of hearsay exclusion is the
preference of the law for live testimony, which is designed to
protect everyone. 59 However, the contravening policy in this
context argues that a defendant cannot hide behind that preference after creating the situation that precludes its use. 60
Although not directly parallel, domestic homicides implicate a similar public policy and equitable analysis. The accused
allegedly killed the only witness to his threats and violence,
who is also the only witness to the homicide. Thus, it seems
only fair that the killer not be shielded from the victim's statements after procuring her silence. However, in domestic homicide cases, the trial is itself about whether the accused killed
the hearsay declarant, so the procurement of witness unavailability question merges with the central issue at trial. This
conflation of the issues argues for a separate rule for threat
hearsay, with an independent determination of reliability or

55. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (Proposed Rule 1996). According to the Committee
Notes, the test for determining waiver will be by a preponderance of the evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note (Proposed Rule 1996).
56. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.66.
57. Id.
58. GRAHAM, supra note 50.
59. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.3.
60. GRAHAM, supra note 50.
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waiver.61
Procurement of witness unavailability cases normally
concern admissibility of prior testimony under oath, which '
presumably carries substantial indicia of reliability, and an
equitable judgment of waiver by misconduct. While domestic
homicide threat hearsay does not involve prior testimony,62
the waiver argument arguably still applies. A victim of domestic violence and threats would generally have as little or less
incentive to lie than would a witness to a crime, and the court
can analyze the circumstances of the victim's declaration for
trustworthiness. 63
If threat hearsay were subject to the same standard as in
procurement cases, a preliminary determination would have to
be made as to whether the accused procured the absence of the
victimlwitness. 64 As this determination would probably be only by a preponderance of the evidence,65 much of this kind of
hearsay would be admitted. However, such safeguards may not
be necessary because, unlike in procurement cases, threat and
abuse hearsay does not directly indict the accused for the
crime, but rather provides one part of cumulative evidence
linking the accused to the crime. Nonetheless, such a preliminary finding may be necessary to ensure that a threat hearsay
exception survives a constitutional challenge.
D. ANALOGY TO CHILD HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN SEX ABUSE
PROSECUTIONS

A related problem arises when courts consider whether
and how to admit hearsay from child victims alleging sexual
abuse. In that context, the child is "unavailable" as a witness
61. See discussion in Part IIIB, infra.
62, In a Westlaw search of cases involving a victim's statements concerning
threats by or fear of the accused, none included any prior testimony by the victim.
63. Often, witnesses made unavailable by the accused had agreed to provide
testimony in exchange for leniency. See, e.g., Markland, supra note 48, at 996-97.
64. Threat hearsay could conceivably fall within Proposed FED. R. EVID.
B04(b)(6), although some problems arise from the conflation of the issue at trial
and the preliminary determination that the accused procured the unavailability of
the witness.
65, See cases cited supra note 52; FED, R. EVID. B04(b)(6) advisory committee's
note (Proposed Rule 1996).
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because of her "tender years"; that is, the child may be emotionally unable to testify in court after disclosing the circumstances of abuse to a parent, doctor, counselor, or officer of the
66
COurt. Yet, because the child victim is the crucial, and frequently only, witness who can link the accused with the
crime,67 a number of states have enacted statutes or modified
their evidence rules so that such testimony may be admitted. 68 Typically, such statutes admit a child's out-of-court
hearsay statement if sufficient indicia of reliability are indicated by the content and circumstances of the declaration. 69
The child abuse hearsay problem differs from threat hearsay in a domestic homicide in two significant ways. First, the
child is only functionally unavailable, so the debate often focuses on the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause - unavailability requirement issues. The confrontation clause gives the
accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him,,,70 so prosecutors must make a good faith effort to produce available witnesses instead of simply offering their prior
statements. 71 Witnesses can be psychologically unavailable; in
the child victim context this has resulted in extensive use of
videotaped and remote testimony and admission of prior statements that fit an existing exception. 72 In contrast to the child
sex abuse victim, the victim of a domestic homicide is invariably dead, and thus clearly unavailable, so the dispute focuses
more explicitly on whether the victim's statements fit into an
existing hearsay exception and on their reliability.
Second, the child witness's testimony, if admitted, directly
implicates the accused and often constitutes the only direct
evidence for the prosecution. 73 Such testimony raises signifi66. Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements
in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1746 (1983).
67. See Henry Weinstein, Child Sex Abuse Cases Pose Dilemma for Prosecutions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at AI; John E. B. Myers et aI., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. I, 34 n.120 (1989).
68. Weinstein, supra note 67; Myers et aI., supra note 67. See also Yun, supra
note 66.

69. See Yun, supra note 66, at 1746 & n.15, citing 1982 WASH. LEGIS. SERVo
ch. 129, § 2 (West).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
71. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
72. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra note 9 at § 8.8l.
73. Many child sexual abuse cases lack physical evidence. Much abuse does
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cant confrontation clause issues because of its centrality to the
prosecution's case. 74 In contrast, while future threat hearsay
may provide a crucial link in the prosecution's case against the
accused, it does not assert that "he killed me" but rather that
"he threatened to kill me" or "[at the time of this statement] I
believe he is going to kill me." Such hearsay would not in itself, if believed, be sufficient evidence for a homicide conviction. Unlike in child sex abuse cases, this indirect evidence
serves more to explicate the nature of the violence in the relationship, to educate the factfinder, and to provide incremental
evidence of motive or identity.
Nonetheless, existing and proposed child hearsay statutes
and rules could serve as a partial model for a threat hearsay
exception given the relative similarity of issues. In a typical
example, the Washington model child sex abuse hearsay statute provides in part:
(A) A statement made by a child, under the

protected age in the statute for which the defendant is being charged, describing any act of
sexual contact on or with the child, is admissible
in evidence in a criminal proceeding if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement
provide particularized guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) The statement was made immediately after
the offense or the court finds the delay consistent with truth;
(3) The statement was not made in preparation

not involve penetration or other physically discernible evidence, the abuse almost
always occurs in secret, and the child does not immediately disclose what happened because of intimidation. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 67; Robert G.
Marks, Note, Should We Believe The People Who Believe The Children?: The Need
for A New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 207 (1995).
74. Under one theory explaining the operation of the confrontation clause,
hearsay is constitutionally admissible if it pertains to a peripheral issue or if it
involves circumstantial or corroborative evidence, but not if it is "direct and critical evidence going to the heart of the prosecutor's case," which is consistent with
the underlying principles of why the constitution gives this protection to a criminal accused. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra note 9, at § 8.75, citing Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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of a legal proceeding; ....75

These standards for determining trustworthiness may be
transferable to the domestic homicide-threat hearsay context.
In both child sex abuse and domestic homicide cases, the
victim has unique information about the accused, evidence that
may be essential to a conviction. Just as for child sex abuse
victims, courts should accord special treatment to statements
by victims of domestic homicide. In both cases, the victims can
provide vital, unique testimony unavailable from any other
source. The constitutional rights of the accused can still be
protected, if "the circumstances of the statement provide particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"76 in the narrow
context of domestic homicide or child sexual abuse.

II. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND FUTURE THREAT
HEARSAY
Published opinions constitute the basis for analysis of how
courts rule on evidentiary questions. 77 Yet, written opinions
reveal only a fraction of all evidence rulings, and thus of hearsay rulings. 78 Because state courts try most criminal cases

75. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1991), quoted in Marks, supra note 73, at
213 n.25 (1995).
76. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980).
77. The O.J. Simpson trial was unique in that each evidence ruling was immediately available electronically, closely scrutinized by the press and legal pundits,
and hotly debated on prime time and during coffee breaks.
78. See generally, Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992). In discussing
the statistical basis for her analysis of the judicial treatment of hearsay and her
predictions of the consequences of liberalization or abolition of the hearsay rule,
Swift points out that,
[e]xtensive data about the behavior of trial judges
toward hearsay is not available. There simply is no
record of most day-to-day rulings on evidence questions. Those rulings that are recorded in pre-trial
orders and in trial transcripts are not easily accessible. Hotly contested evidence rulings can be questioned on appeal, but many rulings are not contested and many cases are not appealed . . . The inaccessibility of trial court actions regarding hearsay is
a frustrating fact of life." Id. at 474.
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and state trial court opinions are not published, the only evidentiary rulings we see are those challenged on appeal. A
further narrowing results from the fact that in criminal cases
only the defendant may appeal evidentiary rulings-with certain narrow exceptions the prosecution cannot appeal adverse
rulings or the final decision in a case-so only the rulings
adverse to the defendant are appealed. 79 Nonetheless, judicial
opinions indicate which hearsay issues are disputed, how
courts treat the issues presented, and how trial judges will
tend to rule in the future. In a limited survey of general hearsay rulings, one commentator found that courts exclude a substantial amount of hearsay at the trial level, so it never reaches public view. 80 She also found that appeals courts usually
affirm the evidentiary rulings of the lower courts, giving great
deference to the trial court rulings on review. 81 In contrast,
my review of hearsay rulings in domestic homicide cases indicates that appellate courts quite frequently find admission of
threat hearsay erroneous (although usually harmless error).82
But, without making a direct statistical comparison between
hearsay rulings in domestic homicide and other cases, it is
impossible to tell whether the statistical pattern in fact differs
in the domestic homicide context.
In a search for rulings excluding or admitting future
threat hearsay, I found that the overwhelming majority of the
cases involved killings of an estranged or former partner, referred to here as "domestic homicide."83 In the domestic homi-

79. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. FRoc. 4(b).
80. Swift, supra note 78, at 474.
81. In Eleanor Swift's opinion, based on her extensive survey of hearsay rulings, "whether federal district courts admit or exclude the hearsay, appellate
courts usually uphold the district courts' decision on appeal." Swift, supra note 78,
at 478.
82. See cases cited in Part IIe-G, infra.
83. I conducted this search on Westlaw, for both state and federal decisions,
and verified it as of April 1996. This search revealed 93 cases challenging admission of threat and abuse or fear hearsay by a homicide victim. Out of these cases,
ten victims were men killed by another man in non-domestic homicides. One victim was the boyfriend of the defendant's ex-wife. Three victims were women killed
in the home by male relatives. In three cases, the victim/declarant was a man
expressing fear of and threats by his spouse. All the remaining cases involved
statements by women who were apparently victims of domestic homicide.
In reviewing these cases, the extraordinary similarity of fact patterns is
almost overwhelming. With minor variations, the same pattern recurs of domestic
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cide context courts admit certain threat hearsay under the
existing exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are modeled
after those in Federal Rules of Evidence. However, admission
of such hearsay varies substantially from state to state, and
among courts within a state. Even in the states with the most
expansive interpretations of the hearsay rules, certain kinds of
threats are excluded altogether, admitted subject to limiting
instructions, or admitted but then held erroneous on appeal.
Among these cases, courts most often admit threat hearsay
under rules similar to Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), which provides
that such evidence may be admitted if the victim's state of
mind is at issue, but only for a limited purpose. 84 The other
exceptions that have been held to apply include the excited
utterance, present sense impression, medical diagnosis, and
residual or "catchall" exceptions.
A.

HEARSAY UNDER THE EXISTING RULES OF EVIDENCE

Under the hearsay rule, out-of-court statements "offered in
evidence to prove the matter asserted" are inadmissible in
court unless the original declarant testifies or the declaration
fits into one of the categorical exceptions to the rule. 85 The
hearsay doctrine arises from the belief that out-of-court statements are intrinsically inferior proof. 86 This perception is usually explained in terms of the risks involved with admitting
hearsay-of misperception, faulty memory, insincerity, and
narrative ambiguity-and the preference for cross-examination
at trial. 87
Numerous exceptions have long coexisted with the hearsay
violence, victim's declarations to friends or professionals regarding fear and
threats, victim's decision to leave the relationship, culminating in a brutal murder.
Then, despite substantial other evidence indicative of guilt, the defendant appeals
admission of even a fraction of the threat hearsay.
84. Standard bases for finding the victim's state of mind at issue include
defendant's claim of accident, self-defense, lack of motive, or, sometimes, simply
that the relationship was peaceful and loving. This evidence is admitted for the
limited purpose of considering the victim's state of mind, but not for the truth of
the matter remembered or believed. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See Part lIE, infra, for
a discussion of domestic homicide cases applying this exception.
85. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.l.
86. [d. at § 8.2.
87. [d.
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rule. Courts have developed these categorical exceptions because of the perception that certain statements are inherently
reliable despite the absence of direct testimony and because
the need for certain evidence outweighs the risks. 88 The necessity for threat evidence is critical in the domestic homicide
context. With the declarant dead-likely at the hands of the
accused-when her statements have a unique evidentiary value, the necessity for that evidence justifies admission despite
the basic hearsay exclusionary rule and the reliability risks.
The categorical hearsay exceptions are not derived from abstract analysis but rather have developed on a more pragmatic,
ad hoc basis; their purpose is "merely to sanction certain situations as a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness," not to permanently define those situations that justify a specific exception. 89
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS BY VICTIM CONCERNING
THREATS BY THE ACCUSED

Courts admit future threat hearsay evidence under some
of the existing exceptions, including those based on Rules
803(1H4) and Rule 804(b)(5). The majority of such threats are
admitted under Rule 803(3), the "state of mind," and Rule
804(b)(5), the residual "catchall," exceptions. 90 However, the
rules are applied inconsistently from state to state. 91 While a
few courts have crafted interpretations that regularly admit
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases under the state-ofmind exception,92 this "gloss" on the rules of evidence is not
authorized by the plain language of any hearsay exception, and
such admissions are generally for a limited purpose.
As is discussed in Parts IIC-G below, many other courts
have applied an unduly restrictive interpretation and reversed
convictions for impermissible admission of hearsay despite
seemingly overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. And,
throughout the cases, many statements by victims concerning

88. See FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804 advisory committee's note.
89. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw (J. Chadbourne, 1974).
90. See discussion in Part IID-E, infra.
91. Id.
92. See cases cited Part IIE1, infra.
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threats by and fear of the accused are barred as inadmissible
hearsay or subject to limiting instructions, or found inadmissible but harmless on appea1. 93
C. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE AS A PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION - FED. R. EVID. 803(1)

Admission of threat hearsay under the present sense impression exception is unusual because the victim rarely describes the threat event while it is occurring, or "immediately
thereafter," as is required by Rule 803(1). To meet this exception, a statement must describe or explain an event or condition made "while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter.,,94 That is, the proponent
must show that the event, the declarant's perception of the
event, and the declarant's statement were contemporaneous,
and the statement must pertain to the declarant's observation
of the event. Because she is almost always alone with her
abuser when the threat is made, the victim is almost never
able to describe the threat contemporaneously.

Commonwealth v. Coleman95 was the only domestic homicide case found in which the present sense impression exception was used to admit threat and abuse hearsay. The threat
evidence was necessary to controvert Coleman's claim that the
victim "had precipitated his action by an unprovoked attack
upon him with a letter opener" and thus that the killing was
voluntary manslaughter, not second-degree murder. 96 The
court held that testimony by the victim's mother that "Diane
telephoned . . . saying that Coleman would not let her leave
the apartment, that he would hang up the phone and that he
was going to kill her" was admissible "under a variant of the
res gestae exception to the hearsay rule" (present sense impression).97 In the majority's opinion, this was warranted by
the immediacy and ongoing character of the events, because
ten minutes later the phone connection was broken at the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Parts IIC-E, infra.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
326 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1974).
[d. at 388.
[d. at 389.
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victim's end, and because only twenty minutes later police
found Diane in the apartment, dead of multiple stab
wounds. 98 In contrast, the concurrence argued that the majority opinion was an impermissible extension of the present
sense impression exception and that the evidence should instead have been admitted as an excited utterance. 99
Utility of the present sense impression rule is obviously
limited in the domestic homicide-threat hearsay context. The
contemporaneity requirements are unlikely to be met in most
domestic violence cases because almost invariably the abuser
threatens in private and isolates the victim from others; most
commonly, the victim discloses the threat after the fact, precluding use of this exception. In addition, statements admissible under this rule are limited to a description of an event or
condition, which would generally not encompass statements of
belief or cumulative fear by the victim.
D. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE
UTTERANCE - FED. R. EVID. 803(2)

AS

AN

EXCITED

Under Rule 803(2), the excited utterance exception, a
"statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition" is admissible. Although certain
statements regarding threats by and victims' fear of the accused are admitted under this exception, the time and emotional stress limitations reduces the utility of this exception in
the threat hearsay context. In general, courts hold that the
time between the stressful event and the declaration must be
quite short, and that the declarant still be under significant
stress of the recent event when she makes the statement. 100
Since such threats and abuse profoundly intimidate and often
virtually imprison the victim, only rarely does she immediately
escape the abuser and disclose her terror. WI

98.
99.
100.
101.
note 5,

[d.
[d. at 391 (Pomeroy, J. concurring).
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.35.
See, e.g., JONES, supra note 13; WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra
at 185-250.
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In a fairly straightforward ruling, the court in State v.
Woodward admitted as an excited utterance the victim's statement to neighbors that her husband planned to kill her.l02
Minutes after her estranged husband arrived at her house,
fought with her father, and took her children, the victim ran
over to her neighbors' house and made the statement while
curled up on the couch in fetal position and sobbing. l03 However, other similar threats disclosed by the victim were not admissible because they did not fit any of the hearsay exceptions,
despite the consistent pattern of threats and abuse in the relationship.l04 Similarly, in State v. Anderson, the victim's statement, made 30 minutes after incident, that her husband had
threatened to kill her was admissible as an excited utterance. 105
However, in Commonwealth v. Myers/0 6 testimony by the
victim's neighbor that a few months before her murder "she
was terribly beat up, her face and eye were all terribly bruised,
and her tooth was chipped, and she told me that her husband
beat her up" and that she was fearful and crying the whole
weekend, was inadmissible. l07 This evidence was not admissible under either the excited utterance or state of mind exceptions, although the victim was killed by multiple stab wounds
shortly thereafter, and the accused claimed that she had attacked him and he had acted in self-defense/os which would
normally place the victim's state of mind at issue.
Anderson and Myers demonstrate the inconsistent manner
in which courts apply the excited utterance exception in do102. 908 P.2d 231, 233 (N.M. 1995).
103. Id. at 234.
104. Id. at 239. The victim's statements about her fear of the accused were
admissible as made to a physician in course of treatment. Her statement to her
counselor that "David [the accused] is going to kill me" was not covered by hearsay exception because it was a "statement of memory or belief," although the court
found it to be harmless error. Id.
105. 723 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. App. 1986). The victim's subsequent description
of the same incident in a family counseling session was admissible as an adoptive
admission, because Anderson nodded when the counselor asked if her description
was true. Id.
106. 609 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1992).
107. Id. at 165 (reversable error).
108. Id. at 162. Investigators determined that the few superficial stab wounds
he had sustained were self-inflicted. Id.
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mestic homicide cases. Further, many victims of domestic violence do not communicate their fear and tell of the threats
against them during a highly emotional state; right after the
attack, they are just trying to survive and forestall further
injury.109 Often, victims of domestic violence are so isolated
that they cannot tell anyone about the violence; it is only later,
when they escape the control of the abuser and the immediate
danger, that they can talk about it.110 By then, the excited
utterance exception no longer applies, even though the victim
arguably has greater perspective on the events and less motive
to fabricate. This exception fails to address the long-term pattern of intimidation in an abusive relationship and how difficult it often is for victims to reveal their situation to others, so
it does not reach the majority of such disclosures.
E. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE UNDER THE STATE OF
MIND EXCEPTION - FED. R. EVID. 803(3)

Under Rule 803(3) "[a] statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health)" may be admitted. III This exception also
admits certain statements to prove the declarant's subsequent
conduct,112 but this broader use rarely applies in threat hearsay cases. Although it is the most commonly used to admit
threat hearsay, this exception contains three crucial limitations for the domestic homicide context: (1) the victim's state of
mind must be at issue;1l3 (2) this exception excludes "a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed" so backward-looking statements about threats are
not admissible as substantive evidence;114 and (3) even if admitted, the statement is subject to limiting instructions to the
jury.ll5

109. See Part IB, supra.
110. See, e.g., HOFELLER, supra note 20, at 94-95.
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
112. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.36.
113. See Part IIE1, infra.
114. See Part IIE2, infra.
115. See Part I1E3, infra.
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1. Admissible if Victim's State of Mind at Issue
When the victim's state of mind is "at issue" most courts
admit expressions of fear-and sometimes threats if intertwined with the expression of fear-by a victim/declarant under Rule 803(3). However, the "at issue" limitation precludes
admission of many statements from domestic homicide victims,
when a court construes "at issue" narrowly or when, as in the
Simpson case, the accused simply claims he was not the perpetrator. Courts generally find the victim's state of mind to be at
issue where the defendant claims that the death was accidental or provoked, or when he claims that the relationship was
peaceful and happy; evidence of abuse, fear, and threats may
then be admitted in rebuttal. 116
The Washington Supreme Court applied a typical analysis
in State v. Parr,117 saying:
. .. if there is no defense which brings into
issue the state of mind of the deceased, evidence
of fears or other emotions is ordinarily not relevant. But where a defense such as that of accident or self-defense is interposed. .. , courts
have generally allowed the admission of evidence of the victim's fears, as probative of the
question whether that person would have been
likely to do the acts claimed by the defendant.us

However, while the court in Parr found the victim's statements of fear admissible under the state of mind exception,

116. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 587 A.2d 188 (Del. Supr. 1990) (statement by
victim about death threats admissible in homicide prosecution if meet standard
requirements of then-existing state of mind exception and if admitted in rebuttal
to evidence of accident, self-defense, suicide, or extreme emotional distress); State
v. Finch, 29 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Cal. App. 1963) (victim's statements of fear of her
husband and threats made by him, admissible under state of mind exception
where he claimed that he was attempting to disarm her); State v. Atchley, 346
P.2d 764 (Cal. 1959), cert. dismissed 366 U.S. 207 (1961) (letter that victim wrote
to a judge two days before her death, saying her husband had threatened her and
she feared him, where defendant claimed she had threatened him, admissible under state of mind exception).
117. 606 P.2d 263 (Wash. 1980).
118. Id. at 269.
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related statements by the victim about threats and other abusive conduct by the accused were not, even though they were
arguably probative of intent. 119
Courts regularly admit statements of fear to rebut claims
of accident.120 For example, in State v. Crawford, the victim's
statement of fear was admissible, even though it included a
statement of her belief about her husband's intent, to show the
nature of their relationship and the effect of his behavior on
her state of mind. 121 This testimony included statements by
the victim saying that she feared the defendant, that he had
threatened to kill her, that he had physically abused her, and
that he had been stalking her.122 Although admissible, the
statements were subject to standard limiting instructions,
which told the jury to consider it only with respect to the
victim's state of mind, not as evidence of the facts asserted. 123
The question of consent also places the victim's state of
mind at issue. In People v. Ortiz, t~e victim's statements that
she was afraid of the accused, and that he had attempted to
rape her and had repeatedly "bothered" her were admissible
under the state-of-mind exception. 124 The victim's state of
mind was at issue because the accused claimed that he and the
victim had engaged in consensual intercourse the morning she
was killed. 125 Similarly, in State v. Faucette, the victim's
statements to her son and her sister regarding threats and
other comments made by her estranged husband were admissible under the state of mind exception to show that she did not
want the accused to visit her home, and to prove that he en-

119. [d.

120. State v. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 1996). See also State v. Magruder,
765 P.2d 716 (Mont. Supr. 1988) (testimony of the victim's daughter about a telephone call from the accused to victim a few hours before her death and the
victim's emotions afterward admissible under state of mind exception where defendant claimed accident). But see Hunt v. State, 429 So.2d 811 (Fla. App. 1983)
(testimony about victim's fear of defendant inadmissible, where defendant claimed
the victim had been accidentally shot).
121. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d at 927.
122. [d. at 926.
123. [d.
124. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 925 (Cal. App. 1995).
125. [d.
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tered without consent. 126
Some courts interpret the state-of-mind exception more
expansively. For example, the court in Brenk v. State allowed a
friend of the victim "to testify that Lou Alice Brenk was crying
and when he asked her 'Lou, what's the matter, Honey?' she
had said to him '[hJe's going to kill me, Dink.,"127 The defendant claimed neither accident nor self-defense, and did not
claim that the relationship was happy or peacefuL 12S Thus,
the victim's state of mind was not at issue under traditional
analysis. Yet, with virtually no explanation as to why the
victim's state of mind was at issue, the trial court allowed this
statement to show Lou Alice's fear, and the state Supreme
Court did not find an abuse of discretion. 129
The Delaware Superior Court seemed to stretch the stateof-mind exception in Re v. State. 130 There the court found admissible the victim's statement that the accused had threatened to kill her and then said "that he would just act like he
was crazy and get off." 131 The court asserted that this was
not offered to prove that the accused would kill her, or that he
would fake insanity, but rather to rebut Re's claim that he
killed the victim due to extreme emotional distress. 132 That
is, the victim's expression of fear contradicted the accused's
argument that she incited stress in him, leading him to kill
her. 133
In a more expansive approach, the Oklahoma court in
Duvall v. State did not require a specific claim by the accused
to place the victim's state of mind-and thus the threats and
her fear-at issue. 134 There, the victim's statements that she
was afraid of her husband because he "told her if she left him
126. 392 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1990).
127. 847 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1993). Although the court calls this exception "present
sense impression" it in fact quotes a rule worded exactly like 803(3), the state-ofmind exception. [d. at 12.
128. [d. at 12-13.
129. [d.
130. 540 A.2d 423 (Del. Supr. 1988).
131. [d. at 430.
132. [d.
133. [d.
134. 825 P.2d 621 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991).
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that he would kill her" were admissible under the state-ofmind exception as relevant to show the victim's fear of the
accused. l35 In Oklahoma courts, hearsay testimony showing
ill feeling, threats or similar conduct by one spouse toward
another are generally considered relevant in "marital homicide" cases. 136 Nonetheless, as always for the state-of-mind
exception, the jury was given limiting instructions on how to
consider the victim's statements in its deliberations. 137
Using a similar exception, the military court in U.S. v.
Elmore admitted threat hearsay to rebut the accused's claim of
relatively harmonious marriage. 138 While no body had been
found, other forensic evidence strongly indicated that the
defendant's wife had been stabbed to death and then dumped
in the sea. 139 There was also substantial hearsay evidence of
prior domestic violence, jealousy, and threats by the defendant. 14O In that case, the court found sufficient circumstantial
evidence combined with the threat hearsay to support a conviction.141
In contrast, Georgia and a number of other states do not
find threat and fear hearsay relevant as such in a domestic
homicide. In Dover v. State, the Georgia court held the victim's
conduct was not at issue in a domestic homicide case. 142
Thus, the victim's statements to several people that she moved
out of the house and met with a divorce attorney because of
her husband's violence and threats were not admissible, although other evidence indicated a history of abuse. l43

135. [d. at 626.
136. [d. (citing a line of Oklahoma cases asserting relevance in this context).
This special category for marital homicide is promising. See discussion in Part IV,

infra.
137. [d. at 626. In fact, in this case the court gave severe instructions, telling
the jury that "[a]t this point, you are instructed to disregard all statements of the
decedent, as they are not relevant to any of the issues you will be called upon to
decide." [d.
138. 33 M.J. 387, 398 (C.M.A. 1991).
139. [d. at 391.
140. [d. at 388-89.
141. [d. at 394.
142. 296 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Ga. 1982).
143. [d.
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Taking a different approach, other courts bifurcate the
question of admissibility of threat evidence, finding a domestic
homicide exception for the relevance determination but then
applying standard hearsay analysis to the statement itself.l44
For example, the Texas court of appeals finds "prior threats
and altercations between the victim and the accused . . . admissible to show relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
the killing and to show the relationship existing between the
two parties" in a domestic homicide or manslaughter prosecution. l45 However, this exception "does not extend the rules of
evidence to admit hearsay testimony that would otherwise
inadmissible."l46 Thus, while allowing a greater scope for the
relevance determination, these courts do not admit threat
hearsay unless it fits an existing hearsay exception under the
traditional analysis.
2. Not Admissible as Statement of Memory or Belief
An additional problem in using the state-of-mind exception

to admit threat hearsay involves the explicit preclusion under
Rule 803(3) of "a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed."147 Because of this limitation,
courts often exclude the victim's statements as impermissible
statements of memory or belief, and, if admitted, they are

144. Other courts explicitly state that evidence concerning the marital relationship may be relevant and admissible for specific purposes in the domestic homicide
context. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 190-91 (1977) (citations omitted). ("admissible to prove ill will, motive, or malice, and that such evidence can include instances in which the defendant threatened, quarrelled with, or
physically abused the victim . . . [but] like any other evidence, it is subject to the
general evidentiary rules governing competency and relevancy"); State v. Hulsing,
825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1991) (in homicide cases involving marital partners,
circumstances showing discord, jealousy, prior assaults, threats in the relationship
are relevant to show motive and malice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), but even
though relevant, victim's statements must also be admissible under a hearsay
exception).
145. Thomas v. State, 886 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1994), citing TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.06.
146. [d. (citations omitted). See also State v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App.
1991) (in homicide cases involving marital partners, circumstances showing discord,
jealousy, prior assaults, threats in the relationship are relvant to show motive and
malice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), but even though relevant, the victim's statements must also be admissible under a hearsay exception).
147. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
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subject to limiting instructions.

As the court put it in State v. Woodward: l48
In this case, [Dr.] Chaffee testified that Debbie
stated that David was going to kill her. He testified that she was calm when she said it, so it
was not an excited utterance. Likewise, this was
not a present sense impression or a statement of
then-existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition. It was a 'statement of memory or
belief and, as such, was inadmissible. 149

Although the appellate court found admission of this statement
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"150 the guidance to lower courts clearly precludes them from admitting similar testimony in the future.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Joe 151 made a similar ruling under almost identical circumstances. Ruling on the
admissibility of the victim's statements to her doctor regarding
rape and threats by her estranged husband, the court said:
With respect to the threat statement, Rule
803(3) therefore would extend to Ms. Joe's statement that she was 'afraid sometimes.' We disagree with the district court's ruling, however,
because Ms. Joe's statement to Dr. Smoker,
though indicating her state of mind, also included an assertion of why she was afraid (i.e., because she thought her husband might kill her).
This portion of Ms. Joe's statement is clearly a
'statement of memory or belief expressly excluded by the Rule 803(3) exception. 152

Similarly, a Texas court held in Navarro v. State that the
victim's statements to her mother were not admissible under

148. 908 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1995).
149. [d. at 239.

150. The court applied this heightened standard of review because Woodward
had invoked the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause in challenging admission of
this evidence. [d.
151. 8 F.3d 1488 (lOth Cir. 1993). This criminal case was in federal court because it involved a Native American defendant.
152. [d. at 1492-93.
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the state of mind exception. 153 In the court's view, the
victim's statements that the accused had "put a gun to her
head and threatened to kill her" and that he had said he would
kill her if she continued to see her parents had no relevance in
the case except to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 154
Thus, "the statements were merely statements of memory to
prove the fact remembered and therefore were not admissible
under rule 803(3)."155
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee stated that:
[t]he exclusion of 'statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed' is
necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the
hearsay rule which would otherwise result from
allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay
statement, to serve as the basis for an inference
of the happening of the event which produced
the state of mind. 156

Therefore, arguing for a simple broadening of the state of mind
exception to remove this limitation would subvert the underlying intent of the rule, and such a change might result in "the
virtual destruction of the hearsay rule.,,157 In contrast, creating a new rule that admits "statements of memory or belief' in
the narrow context of domestic homicides would not.
3. Admission Subject to Limiting Instructions
Even when admitted under the state-of-mind exception,
threat hearsay is subject to limiting instructions to the jury.
The court typically instructs the jury to consider the statements only with respect to the state of mind of the victim, not
as evidence of the truth of the facts stated. 158 Some courts
have developed a more restrictive rule in which "a victim's
extra-judicial declarations of fear of the defendant are admissi153.
154.
155.
156.
States,
157.
158.

863 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. App. 1993).
[d.
[d. (citations omitted).
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note, citing Shepard v. United
290 U.S. 96 (1933).
[d.
See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at §§ 1.14, 1.16.
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ble under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule with
a limiting instruction only if there is a manifest need for such
evidence, i.e., if it is relevant to a material issue in the
case."159 In what it characterizes as a standard limiting instruction,160 the court in Duvall v. State seems to craft an
even more restrictive instruction regarding threat hearsay: the
judge instructed the jury to completely disregard the victim's
statements after they had previously been admitted. 161
There is serious doubt about whether juries pay meaningful attention to limiting instructions and whether they even
begin to make the fine distinctions called for. But, to the extent that juries do understand and follow limiting instructions,
the victim's unique evidence concerning the abuser is excluded
from their determinations. Even where the jury instruction
does not affect the outcome of the case, limiting use of the
victim's words implies a disregard of their importance and
validity.
F. TREATMENT OF THREAT HEARSAY UNDER THE MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS EXCEPTION - FED. R. EVID B03C 4)

Threat hearsay rarely comes in under the medical diagnosis exception. This seems logical because such statements, to
be admissible, must be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. "162 Since fear may be relevant to depression or
stress-related illness, courts admit a victim's statements that
159. State v. Washington, 726 P.2d 43 (Wash. App. 1986) (emphasis added).
160. This instruction is much more severe than a typical limiting instruction,
indicating that perhaps the judge changed his mind after admitting the hearsay.
See State v. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d at 926, and State v. Solo7.ano, 726 P.2d at 52,
for more standard instructions in the threat hearsay context.
161. 825 P.2d 621, 626 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991). The court said:
You were instructed during the trial that you could con·
sider the statements only as they might relate to the
decedent's state of mind. At this point, you are instructed
to disregard all statements of the decedent, as they are
not relevant to any of the issues you will be called upon
to decide. [d.
There was substantial corroboration of the threats and abuse, and the dispute
pertained to whether the homicide was premeditated or a result of "heat of passion," so the conviction was not affected by the instruction. [d.
162. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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she was afraid of the accused. However, threats are usually
excluded as not pertinent. My search found only two domestic
homicide cases in which courts admitted such hearsay under
this exception.
In State v. Woodward, the court admitted various statements by the victim about threats by and her fear of the accused. 163. The victim's statements that she had been abused
by her husband and she was deathly afraid of him were admissible as made to physician in course of treatment, as necessary
information in treating the victim's situational depression. 164
However, her statement that she was afraid because "David is
going to kill me" was inadmissible, although harmless error,
because it was not pertinent to the diagnosis. 165
In contrast, in State v. Moen, the Oregon Supreme Court
held admissible a victim's complete statement to her physician
describing abusive conduct by the accused and her fear that he
might kill her.166 In this case, the statement was considered
pertinent information explaining the victim's severe nervousness and depression. 167 Here the victim was the mother-inlaw of the accused, not his wife, but the circumstances were
similar to those in domestic homicides, in that the violence
followed the typical pattern.
G. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE UNDER THE CATCHALL
EXCEPI'ION - FED. R. EVID. 804(B)(5)
The residual, or catchall, exception provides that a statement having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is admissible], if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence proponent can

163. 908 P.2d 231, 239 (N.M. 1995).
164. [d.
165. [d.

166. 786 P.2d 111, 119-20 (Or. 1990).
167. [d. at 120.
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procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission... 168

A number of courts have admitted threat hearsay in domestic
homicides under the catchall exception; certain exemplars are
discussed infra.
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently took a promising approach in State v. Baker, in which it admitted the
victim's statements under what it called the "exception for
unavailable declarant," which was the state equivalent of the
catchall. ls9 The court focused on the victim's personal knowledge of underlying events, her motivation to speak the truth to
the witness, whether she ever recanted her statement, the
nature and character of statement, and the relationship between the parties. 170 Here, the court found that the declarant
was likely to be honest in statements made to a close friend,
and that the victim's statement to the police regarding ill will
between the accused and the victim, the victim's fear of him,
and his prior attacks on the victim were likely to possess requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. 171
In a similar vein, the Georgia court in Hawkins v.
State l72 admitted the victim's statements under the catchall
exception, finding sufficient reliability and relevance~ Three
days before she was killed by four shotgun blasts at close
range, the victim made a report to the police in which she said
that her husband had threatened to shoot her.173 The court
held that this statement was relevant to show the accused's
intent and course of conduct. 174 In affirming the decision of
the trial court, the supreme court emphasized "that the evidence was excepted from the hearsay rule by necessity, the
declarant being unavailable because of her death ... and the

168. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
169. 451 S.E.2d 574, 592 (N.C. 1994) (citing the state equivalent of FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5».
170. Id.
171. Id. at 593.
172. 448 S.E.2d 214 (Ga. 1994).
173. Id. at 215.
174. [d.
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statement being replete with indicia of reliability."175
Similarly, in State v. Faucette the court found statements
made by the victim to her attorney admissible under the catchall exception. 176 The court admitted the evidence with reasoning similar to that used in the state-of-mind cases; it was considered relevant to rebut the contention that the accused went
to the victim's home to talk with the victim and see his son,
not with intent to murder her. 177 In the catchall exception
analysis, the court found these statements to be the most probative evidence available regarding domestic problems between
the accused and victim. 178 Further, the attorney-client relationship provided a sufficient guaranty of trustworthiness. 179
In contrast, the Iowa court in State v. Williams l80 held
inadmissible testimony that was arguably more reliable and
probative than the cases cited supra. In Williams, the victim's
domestic relations attorney testified about a conversation on
the morning of the murder in which the victim told him that
"the defendant, on the previous day, had threatened to throw
her through a plate glass window and use the broken glass to
cut her head Off."lBl In the court's view, "[t]he only discernible
purpose of this testimony was to establish the threat was
made. That, of course, depends on the truth of the matters
asserted by [the victim]."lB2 Despite seemingly overwhelming
evidence against the accused and despite his claim of "accident/struggle," the court did not find the threat hearsay admissible under the residual or any other hearsay exception. l83
The court went further, holding the admission of this evidence
to be reversible error, despite substantial evidence indicating
the defendant's guilt, including forensic evidence showing that

175. [d. (citations omitted).
176. 392 S.E.2d 71, 75 (N.C. 1990).
177. [d.
178. [d. at 76.
179. [d.
180. 427 N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 1988).
181. [d. at 471.
182. [d. I argue that such testimony should be admitted for the truth of the
matter asserted. That is why a new hearsay exception is required.
183. See Part lIE, supra, for discussion of cases in which such evidence was
admitted under the state-of-mind exception, although subject to limiting instructions.
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the victim was shot while lying on the bed rather than while
standing beside it and the testimony of two witnesses that he
had threatened to kill the victim only hours before she
died. l84
These catchall cases illustrate how much courts vary in
their treatment of threat hearsay in the domestic homicide
context. In general, the courts appear to disagree about the
meaning of the catchall exceptions and fail to use them as
intended, in part because of the ambiguity of the rules and the
limitations inherent in the hearsay doctrine. l85
While the catchall exception would seem flexible enough to
admit statements made to family, friends, or professionals
about domestic abuse, threats, and intimidation, it does not
appear to be generally used in this context. Unlike in the child
sex abuse and witness procurement contexts, this exception is
not used extensively to admit threat hearsay and does not
seem to be undergoing any substantial development in threat
hearsay-domestic homicide cases. Instead, this judicial modification and extension of the hearsay rule seems to be occurring
primarily within the more restrictive state-of-mind exception. l86 Nonetheless, a framework for determining constitutional reliability can be derived from the judicially developed
approaches to admission of threat hearsay under the catchall
exception.
H. LIMITS OF THE EXISTING HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS PREVENT
THE VICTIM'S WORDS FROM BEING HEARD

It could be said that many courts have contorted and
stretched the existing hearsay exceptions in order to admit
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases. Although we might
agree with the particular ruling or the result in a case, adaptation or revision of the rules of evidence should not be left to
the discretion of individual trial judges. Not only does judicial

184. 427 N.W.2d at 470.
185. David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule:
Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867 (1982).
186. See discussion Part lIE, supra.
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modification of the rules probably exceed their authority, it
fails to provide sufficient guidance to counsel and other judges.
And it fails to give notice to abusers that hidden threats will
not remain hidden if the victim is silenced. 187
A specific hearsay exception, derived in part from the more
expansive readings of the existing exceptions, would provide
greater clarity and certainty to litigants and courts; it would
also explicitly assert a public policy against domestic violence.
In order to systematically admit this sometimes crucial evidence within the domestic homicide context, the federal and
state rules of evidence should be revised to include a new exception. Thus, all the threat hearsay statements of the victim
would be admissible under one rule, rather than admitted
under an array of exceptions or precluded in a piecemeal fashion as occurs now.

III. CRITIQUES OF THE HEARSAY RULES AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Many commentators advocate abolition or substantial
revision of the existing hearsay rules and exceptions. 188 These

187. While it is dubious that abusers know or think about hearsay rules, the
concept of notice is basic to our jurisprudence, and systematic approaches to evidence potentially filter into the general social consciousness.
188. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence after Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need
for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857 (1992) (an Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Evidence should be created to systematically overhaul the rules,
including the residual hearsay exceptions); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hear·
say: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893 (1992) (the
existing rules are irrational and undermine respect for the legal system; proposing
a rule that incorporates the preference for in-court testimony, but allows admission
of hearsay "that, by its very nature . . . is sometimes the best evidence of its
assertive content"); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1339 (1987) (hearsay analysis should focus on the foundation witness to provide evidence about the circumstances surrounding the declaration rather than specific, fact-laden exceptions); Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule
Against Hearsay, 35 U. PITI'. L. REV. 609, 621-28 (1974) (the expected error from
admitting hearsay is low, so should be admitted unless the jury will assign it at
least twice its real weight). See generally Christopher B. Mueller, Post·Modern
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1992), for
an incisive review of the leading critiques of the hearsay rules and proposals for
change, and a proposal for reform of his own.
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proposals tend to focus on establishing a simple overarching
framework for admission of hearsay and eliminating the many
exceptions. However, other evidence experts oppose "over-simplifying" the hearsay rules and persuasively argue that complexity and detail is needed for predictability and consistency.189
Although some of these proposals point out fruitful directions for hearsay treatment, creating a specific exception for
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases seems more viable.
While courts might admit future threat evidence under these
broad proposed rule changes, it is unlikely that such comprehensive revisions will be enacted. A specific, new exception is
also more workable in that it would clearly instruct courts on
the priority of this evidence and greatly reduce the opportunity
of variable applicatipn. Further, legislative and judicial recognition that these victims words should be heard may be a factor in stemming domestic violence and domestic homicide.
Commentators have argued for promulgation of new hearsay exceptions for statements by child sexual abuse victims 190
and for statements of witnesses whose unavailability has been
procured by the accused. 191 These also may serve as useful
models for analysis and creation of a future threat exception,

189. Mueller, supra note 188.
First, lawyers have to prepare for trial and know what
they are up against . . . Second, it is not clear that judges will perfonn better without rules to apply . . . Trial
judges may need rules of some sort to deal wisely with
hearsay. It is one thing for Judge Weinstein, who is both
a scholar and an extraordinary jurist, to claim judges
work better without rules, and quite another to suppose
most judges can do so. Rules also invite a second look by
appellate courts, which probably contributes to the development of sound doctrine and corrects some mistakes . . .
Finally, even discretionary rules will produce doctrinal
complexity unless they grant judges essentially complete
discretion. Id. at 397 (citations omitted).

190. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 73; Sharon Kennedy, Note, Idaho v. Wright:
The Confrontation Clause Limits on the Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Child
Abuse Cases, 59 UMKC LAw REV. 1093 (1991).
191. See, e.g., David J. Tess, Losing the Right to Confront: Defining Waiver to
Better Address a Defendant's Actions and Their Effects on a Witness, 27 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 877 (1994).
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and so are discussed in Part IIIB, infra.
A. COMPREHENSIVE REFORM PRoPOSALS
1. The "Best Evidence" Rule

One interesting, broad proposal calls for replacing the
existing hearsay rules by a ''best evidence" hearsay standard in
which there is a general rule of preference for in-court testimony, but all hearsay is admitted when the declarant is unavailable. 192 In this proposal, "[h]earsay is the 'best evidence'
when the declarant is physically unavailable, as by reason of
death.... "193 According to this theory, in many cases the
party offering "hearsay evidence is driven by necessity, not a
desire to gain an unfair tactical advantage,"194 so the system
should not operate to block hearsay as such, particularly when
no probative alternative evidence is available. In this view, "a
rule of automatic exclusion merely shifts the disadvantage to
the proponent, and does so to the detriment of the fact-finding
process.,,195 The search for truth could thus be better served
by establishing different criteria for admission/exclusion of
hearsay evidence. Because hearsay may inherently be "the best
evidence of its assertive content, "196 it should be admitted
even when less preferred testimony can be given by available
declarants.
Although the best evidence rule may well encompass future threat hearsay, its generality and ambiguity make it unlikely that admission of future threats in domestic homicide
cases would survive a constitutional challenge. Some crucial
issues remain unresolved under this approach. Threat hearsay
potentially raises confrontation clause issues that remain unresolved in the proposed rule. Given the nature of this evidence
and the protections guaranteed to criminal defendants, simply
admitting all hearsay by unavailable declarants, requiring
192. Seigel, supra note 188, at 896. "Hearsay is admissible if it is the best evidence available to the offering party from a particular declarant source, or if the
best evidence has been or will be presented to the trier of fact." Id. at 929.
193. Id. at 933.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 896.
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corroborative evidence, and then providing various limiting
instructions to the jury may not meet the constitutional test
for non-firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Rather than directly
addressing the fundamental problem, and according special
status to victim's statements, this approach treats all hearsay
by unavailable declarants as essentially equaL Further, the
validity and sufficiency of threat evidence may be limited in
this approach because in criminal cases it would be necessary
to corroborate hearsay before it could support a conviction. 197
It is not clear what would constitute adequate corroboration
under this proposal, although support by other testimonial or
circumstantial evidence may be enough. In any case, adoption
of such a broad rule would probably not lead to the necessary
changes in how the legal system handles domestic violence and
homicide.

2. Foundation Fact Approach
In an approach that that has been characterized as "[o]ne
of the most striking and original proposals on hearsay reform,"198 Eleanor Swift argues that hearsay should be admissible after a showing of "foundation facts" that would enable a
jury to evaluate the hearsay intelligently. 199 According to
Swift, the current hearsay doctrine errs in excluding relevant
information that would help the trier of fact. As she puts it,
the "foundation fact approach admits hearsay when the proponent produces foundation facts about the circumstances surrounding a statement that allow the trier of fact to assess the
reliability of the statement for itself.,,2°O Essentially, the foundation witness testifies as to the circumstances in which the
declarant's statement was made and positively identifies the
declarant. 201
The foundation fact approach obligates the pro-

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Seigel, supra note 188, at 942.
Mueller, supra note 188, at 402.
Swift, supra note 188, at 1355.
[d. at 1390.
[d. at 1391.
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ponent of hearsay to produce a foundation witness knowledgeable about the circumstances
affecting the declarant's process of perceiving,
remembering, and making a statement about a
relevant event. This witness serves as the source
of information for the trier's evaluation and is
subject to cross-examination by the opponent. 202

Swift cites cases in which "a declarant's description of her
husband's or boyfriend's threat is offered in the prosecution of
the husbandlboyfriend for the declarant's subsequent murder"
as examples of how the "adjusted foundation" would affect
hearsay rulings. 203 In the two cases she cites, both involved
testimony that the victim had described "a telephone conversation with defendant ... in which she told [him] she intended to
get an annulment and he replied he would kill her if she left
him.,,204 In one case, this evidence was admitted as a present
sense impression, and in the other it was not, because too
much time had elapsed. 205 According to Swift, under the
foundation fact approach both statements would be admissible,
because "[i]n both cases, the declarants describe the context in
which they perceived and remembered the threat... The
foundation witness in each case could testify about the circumstances at the time each declarant made her statement. Moreover, in each case, the foundation witness ... could have qualified as an identification witness."206
This proposed comprehensive revision of hearsay might
well result in inclusion of much threat evidence, as Professor
Swift's examples indicate. However, even she acknowledges
that the likelihood of such a "radical" proposal being adopted is
unlikely.207 Within the narrow framework of a new categorical exception, these principles may provide guidance in developing a workable exception that admits threat hearsay without
violating the constitutional rights of the defendant.

202.
203.
204.
(1980).
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1402 n.206.
Swift, supra note 188, at 1402, quoting People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 480
Id. at 1402.
Id.
Id. at 1428.
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B. PROPOSED THREAT EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
In general, courts have used the residual hearsay exceptions to expand hearsay exceptions in particular areas. 208
Evolution of the catchall exceptions to admit previously excluded hearsay tends to argue for formulating a new categorical exception. That is, "[o]nce it becomes evident that the residual
exception is being used repeatedly to cover a certain type of
hearsay, such as out-of-court statements of child victims of
sexual assault, an Advisory Committee should consider either
creating a new exception, or labeling the evidence as inadmissible hearsay.,,209 In part, this is because "the stare decisis effect of the residual exception is limited to the facts of individual cases,,210 and "clarity and certainty in the Rules [of Evidence] is critically important ... Careful revision will not undermine, but, rather, enhance the certainty of the Rules, given
the current state of confusion surrounding many of them.,,211
Although courts do use the exception in the context of
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases, it is not "used repeatedly" as in the child sex abuse and procurement of witness
unavailability cases. 212 Courts more commonly seem to be
modifying the state-of-mind exception· to admit previously
inadmissible threat and fear hearsay in domestic homicide
cases.213 Thus, the same argument may apply. That is, the
Advisory Committee should create a new exception in order to
reestablish clarity and certainty in the Rules and reduce confusion in this area.

208. See generally Becker & Orenstein, supra note 188.
209. [d. at 909.
210. [d., citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
STATE COURTS (Supp. 1991).

211. [d.

212. See discussion in Parts IC-D, supra.
213. See discussion in Part IIG, supra.
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1. Constitutional Limitations
Any new hearsay exception is by definition not "firmly
rooted" in the law, so it must meet certain constitutional requirements in a criminal case. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.,,214 Although this does not bar admission of all hearsay
in criminal prosecutions, it does add additional constraints.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, when a declarant is
unavailable, unless the hearsay statement fits into a "firmly
rooted" exception it must provide certain "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."215
The Court has not specified exactly what constitutes such
particularized guarantees. However, external corroborating
evidence is not sufficient; the trustworthiness must be somehow intrinsic to the statement itself.216 Thus, to provide a
"particularized guarantee" in domestic homicide cases, threat
hearsay could be admitted subject to a preliminary determination that a pattern of threats and violence existed in the relationship, and that the circumstances and content of the
victim's statement support an inference that she was telling
the truth.
2. Proposed Rule 804(b)(7)217
A hearsay exception that would admit threat and abuse
statements by a domestic homicide victim could take many
forms. One reasonable approach was presented to the California Assembly, in the form of a bill to amend the California
Evidence code by creating a new exception to the hearsay
rule,218 which was substantially modified before enact-

214. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
215. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
216. [d.

217. Proposed Rule 804(b)(6) has been promUlgated and distributed for comment
by the Rules Advisory Committee, so the rule proposed here would be Rule
804(b)(7).
218. The bill, AB 2068, proposed the following rule:
1360. Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made
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ment. 219 I propose an exception similar to the California rule,
with certain modifications, as follows:
804(b)(7). A statement by a declarant is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the
following conditions are met:
(A) The declarant is deceased and was the

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all the following conditions are met:
(a) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain
an act, condition, or event purportedly perceived by the
declarant.
(b) The act, condition, or event referred to in subdivision
(a) is the infliction or threat of physical harm upon the
declarant against whom the statement is offered.
(c) The party against whom the statement is offered has
been held civilly liable for, or has been convicted of or
has entered a plea of no contest to any crime based upon,
any incident of infliction or threat of infliction of physical
harm upon the declarant.
219. As enacted, the rule states as follows:(a) Evidence of a statement by a
declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain
the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to
Section 240.
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the
infliction or threat of physical injury. Evidence of statements made more than five years before the filing of the
current action or proceeding shall be inadmissible under
this section.
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that
would indicate its trustworthiness.
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically
recorded, or made to a law enforcement official.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), circumstances relevant to the issue of trustworthiness include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of
pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant
was interested.
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating the statement, and the extent of any bias or motive.
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence
other than statements that are admissible only pursuant
to this section.
CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1997).
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spouse or domestic partner or former spouse or
domestic partner of the person against whom
the statement is offered.
(B) The statement narrates, describes, or explains an act, condition, event or series of events
perceived by the declarant, or the statement
purports to express the declarant's belief concerning an act, condition, event or series of
events.
(C) The act, condition, or event or series of
events referred to in subdivision (B) is the infliction or threat of physical harm upon the declarant by the party against whom the statement is
offered.
(D) The party against whom the statement is
offered has been held civilly liable for, or has
been convicted of or has entered a plea of no
contest to any crime based upon, infliction or
threat of infliction of physical harm upon the
declarant, or the court determines, in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of the jury, that
the party against whom the statement is offered
has inflicted or threatened to inflict physical
harm upon the declarant within five years prior
to the hearing.
(E) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement
provide particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. In making this determination, the court
will consider (1) declarant's personal knowledge
of the underlying events and motivation to
speak the truth, (2) whether the declarant recanted the statement before death, the nature
and character of the statement, (3) the relationship between declarant and the party against
whom the statement is offered, and (4) the relationship between declarant and the testifying
witness.

Under this proposed rule, the domestic homicide victim's
out-of-court statements will be generally admissible against
the accused spouse or domestic partner. Unlike the California
proposed and enacted rules, Subdivision A specifically limits
the exception to statements of the victim in a domestic homi-
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cide prosecution.
Subdivision B would allow a victim's statements concerning incidents of threats and violence to be admitted. 220 Unlike
the California proposed and enacted rules, this rule would
additionally permit admission of the victim's statements of fear
and belief that her partner is going to kill her, even absent
explicit threats by the accused, based on her perception of the
overall pattern of abuse and threat in the relationship.
The California proposed rule conditioned admissibility on
prior civil liability or a criminal conviction or plea based on
infliction or threat of physical harm on the declarant. 221 The
California rule as enacted does not require a prior conviction
or plea, but requires that the statement be recorded or made to
a law enforcement officer at or near the time of the infliction
or threat of physical harm. 222
Both of these requirements unnecessarily restrict utility of
the exception. In the majority of cases involving declarations
by domestic homicide victims, there has been no prior legal
determination of threatening or abusive incidents. 223 Rarely
do the victims write down, record, or report the threat or injury to law enforcement personnel. She tells her doctor, her lawyer, her mother, her .sister, her best friend. Cumulative evidence by various witnesses can reliably establish the pattern of
threats and violence in the relationship.224 This pattern can
presumably be extrapolated to the many hearsay rulings never
recorded on appeal. Because of these discrepancies, the rule I
220. Both the proposed and enacted California rules reach beyond the marital
homicide context to situations in which prior threat or infliction of harm to the
declarant can be shown. For example, under the proposed rule, if a parent or
child has been abused and later killed, their words also would be admissible under the proposed rule. Certain non-domestic homicides would also meet the requirements of this exception. Under the enacted rule, the statements of any decedent who had been subjected to threats or violence and who meets the other requirements would be admissible; this raises other questions about the constitutional "indicia of reliability. n
221. See note 211, supra.
222. CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(3), (5) (West Supp. 1997).
223. See, e.g., Part IB and cases discussed in Part II, supra.
224. The no-contest plea by O.J. Simpson in the prior attack on Nicole Brown
Simpson was unusual. Most incidents of domestic violence are never reported, and
those that do rarely get to court.
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propose broadens the condition in Subdivision D to let the
court make a preliminary determination that harm or threats
of harm were inflicted on the declarant by the accused, but
limits the permissible time frame. Thus, my proposed rule
would admit statements by the many domestic violence victims
who do not pursue complaints against their abusers prior to
being killed and who do not record the threats, yet still provide
reasonable protections for the accused.
Creating a new exception for threat hearsay raises confrontation clause issues that must be addressed by a determination that the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability."225 The reliability requirement can be met where the
statement either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception
or is supported by a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness,"226 shown by a totality of the circumstances
surrounding the declaration, which would indicate that the
declarant is particularly worthy of belief and that "adversarial
testing would add little to its reliability."227
The relatively narrow application of this exception as well
as the inquiry into indicia of reliability required by Subdivision
E would address the confrontation clause issues. I have argued
here that the victim of domestic violence has unique knowledge
about the abuser's potential for violence that should be accorded special status as the ''best evidence" available and as necessary information for the trier of fact. If accepted, this status in
itself should provide the basis for a showing of constitutional
reliability. Further, a number of courts have applied tests
similar to that set out in Subdivision E to verify the trustworthiness of such statements in domestic homicide cases under
the catchall hearsay exception, and these admissions have
survived constitutional challenge. 228

225.
226.
227.
228.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980).
[d.
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
See discussion in Part IIG, supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, courts apply the hearsay rule inconsistently in
domestic homicide cases. Some courts seem to stretch the exceptions past permissible bounds, while others apply the hearsay rule and its exceptions strictly, finding no applicable exceptions for the victim's statements about her abuser. Courts
admit threat, fear, and abuse hearsay under a patchwork of
exceptions, while they exclude vital portions of the victim's
words. Courts of appeal regularly hold such hearsay to have
been erroneously admitted. These cases cry out for a new approach, one that recognizes the unique situation facing victims
of domestic violence and homicide. Proposed Rule 804(b)(7)
offers a possibility for change, one that will allow the victims'
words finally to be heard.
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